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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 1988 a pharmaceutical firm announced it would begin
marketing a pill in France designed to induce abortion in the very early
stages of pregnancy. Several weeks later, the company retracted its origi-
nal announcement. Motivated by vocal anti-abortion activism in France
and the United States, which included threats of a boycott of all of the
company's products as well as threats on the lives of company officials, the
drug company decided to withhold the pill, known as RU 486, from the
French market. However, within days of the French company's retraction,
the French government-which owns thirty-six percent of the French
subsidiary of the German-based company, Hoechst, that markets the
pill-ordered the company to sell it in France. The French Health Minis-
ter declared that in the few weeks that the abortion pill's existence had
become common knowledge, it had become "the moral property of
women."'
In the United States, where opposition to the pill is particularly vocal,
the story has been different. Hoechst is susceptible to American threats of
a boycott because the American pharmaceutical market represents a sig-
nificant portion of its earnings. Aware of previous boycotts instigated by
American anti-abortionists, most notably the extended boycott of products
manufactured by the Upjohn drug company, Hoechst, so far, has decided
against marketing the pill in the United States.
The pill's introduction into the French market has ignited speculation
about whether or not it will appear in the United States. At the same
time, the perceived ease of this new form of abortion has heightened moral
divisions over the issue of abortion. The U.S. response to RU 486 is
deeply divided among those morally opposed to any form of abortion,
those discomforted by the apparent ease of chemical abortion, those sup-
portive of an abortion option easier than surgery, and finally, those who
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are unwilling to advocate any form of birth control which alters the chem-
ical structure of a woman's body.
If RU 486 were approved for sale in the United States, though, its legal
implications would not at all mirror the moral division that splits Ameri-
can opinion on the pill. Rather, the pill would fit neatly within the federal
law of abortion announced in Roe v. Wade.2 While the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe did not anticipate that abortion could be performed by a
method other than surgery, chemical abortion by RU 486 would be con-
sistent with the legal scheme Roe devised for surgical abortion. In fact,
chemical abortion is more consistent with the privacy holdings on which
Roe is based than is surgical abortion, the form made legal in Roe.
While RU 486 is currently thought of and used only as an abortion
pill, it may eventually be developed for use as a contraceptive. The pill
has the potential to be used monthly, whether or not a woman is preg-
nant. If it is developed for regular monthly use, it is possible, though un-
likely, that it would fit within federal regulation governing contraception.
The pill's classification as a contraceptive would insulate it from changes
in American abortion law, changes many people believe are imminent
since the Court this term is considering the validity of Roe.'
Since September, news of RU 486 has been splashed across the front
pages of newspapers across the United States, prompting outraged letters
to the editor and motivating enthusiastic editorials. The pill has been her-
alded as having the potential to end the abortion debate by those who
accept abortion, and decried for the same reasons by those who do not.
Lost in this outpouring is concern about the pill's effects on women's
health, which, ironically, is the central concern of Roe.
The immediate side effects of the pill, the dangers arising from the
pill's possible failure to induce complete abortion, and the lack of informa-
tion about the pill's long-term effects have not been given much attention
in media reports. But the appearance of the abortion pill prompts a
pointed observation with respect to women's health: that birth control
technology is directed primarily at interfering with women's reproductive
capacities, not men's, and that much of this technology has enjoyed wide-
spread acceptance before new methods have been proven safe. It is troub-
ling that we have been so free to manipulate a woman's body, willing
even to alter a woman's chemical structure, yet have spent little time ex-
ploring non-invasive forms of birth control or methods designed for use by
men. This last view, not adequately represented in popular reaction to the
pill, would demand thorough, long-term testing of RU 486, and counsel
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), prob. juris noted,
109 S. Ct. 780 (1989) (No. 88-605). For a list of the questions presented by the case see 57 U.S.L.W.
3441, 3441-42 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1989).
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caution before advocating its use or believing in its potential to alter fun-
damentally the American abortion debate.
II. THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION APPROVAL PROCESS
Before being introduced for sale in the United States on the open mar-
ket, any new drug must be approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, a part of the Department of Health and Human Services. The long
process of getting FDA approval for a new drug is triggered by the appli-
cation of the drug's sponsor, and can take up to ten years.4 While the
approval process for RU 486 would probably be significantly shorter be-
cause of the vast testing data already generated by foreign researchers,5
the American approval process has not yet begun because no drug com-
pany has petitioned the FDA for approval of RU 486. Although a 1988
change in FDA policy allows some Americans to have access to drugs that
have not been approved for U.S. sale if the patients import them from
foreign countries by mail for their own personal use, importation of RU
486 is specifically excepted from the policy by an unpublished Import
Bulletin Directive issued by the agency.'
The standards that must be met for FDA approval of a new drug are
safety for the recommended use and substantial evidence of efficacy.7 The
FDA does not itself test a drug, but supervises and evaluates for safety
and efficacy the drug trials conducted by the drug's sponsor, by the Na-
tional Institutes of Health, or by others. Before the FDA will allow a
drug to be tested on humans, the drug's sponsor must submit results from
4. See Eigo, Harrington, McCarthy, Spinella & Sugden, ACT-NOW FDA Action Handbook, 9
(1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter Eigo]. See also FDA, Chart Illustrating the FDA Approval
Process (Jan. 22, 1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter FDA Chart]. The FDA is not required to
approve or disapprove a drug in the absence of an application. See Gadler v. United States, 425 F.
Supp. 244, 248 (D. Minn. 1977); 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (1982).
5. In general, the FDA accepts foreign clinical studies to support an application when, in the
judgment of the FDA, the studies are "well designed, well conducted, performed by qualified investi-
gators, and conducted in accordance with ethical principles acceptable to the world community." See
21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (1988); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.106 (1988).
6. See FDA, Pilot Guidance for Release of Mail Importations, Unpublished Policy Field Direc-
tive (July 20, 1988) (on file with author); FDA, Import Bulletin #66-B13 "RU486", Unpublished
Policy Field Directive (Sept. 26, 1988) (on file with author).
I interviewed Brad Stone, press spokesperson for the FDA, by telephone in March 1989 about the
FDA's mail import policy with respect to RU 486. The July 20, 1988 policy directive issued by the
Office of Regional Operations allows drugs unapproved by the FDA to be imported by patients under
certain conditions. However, the September 26, 1988 directive issued by the Division of Field Investi-
gations specifically prohibits RU 486 from being imported under the earlier directive.
If a woman were able to obtain a prescription from a French doctor, however, she might be able to
bring her personal prescription into the United States. See Thomas, New Abortion Method Hit by
Safety and Moral Questions, The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 16, 1988, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter
Thomas]. Though the FDA does not exempt drugs brought in for personal use from the general
prohibition on the importation of unapproved drugs, another FDA spokesperson expressed doubt that
RU 486 would be seized from a woman attempting to bring it with her from France into the United
States: "Whether the agency would confiscate [RU 486] is another story." Telephone interview with
Sandra Wetstone (Mar. 1989).
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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non-human studies.8 If the FDA approves trials using human subjects, the
drug is first tested on twenty to eighty people for toxicity and dose ranges,
a process which takes about a year.9 Phase Two testing, for effectiveness
and major side effects, involves several hundred subjects and can take
about three years.10 Phase Three testing, involving several hundred to sev-
eral thousand subjects and lasting several years, is to confirm findings of
effectiveness and to discover any long-term side effects." The drug com-
pany applies to the FDA for approval to market a new drug when Phase
Three testing has been completed.'
2
There is an exception to the FDA regulatory scheme relevant to the
discussion of RU 486. American doctors may prescribe an FDA approved
drug for a use other than the use approved, an exception relevant to RU
486 because the drug has effects other than inducing abortion and is cur-
rently being tested by the National Institutes of Health as a treatment for
other conditions."3 Under existing law, the possibility exists that if the
FDA approved RU 486 for use other than as an abortion pill, it would be
available to doctors to prescribe as an abortifacient. While the FDA does
not have jurisdiction to regulate the administration of a drug by a physi-
cian, 4 the potential liability of a physician who chose to prescribe RU
486 for abortions may be sufficient to render this possibility remote."
Ill. RU 486 AS A POTENTIAL CONTRACEPTIVE
RU 486 is currently thought of as an abortion method, and indeed, that
is its only current use outside of investigational research. The developers
of the pill, however, indicate that RU 486 may one day be used as a
monthly menstruation inducer.' While this projected use of the pill re-
mains in the realm of medical researchers' optimistic conjecture, the possi-
bility raises the threshold question of what the distinction is between con-
8. See Eigo, supra note 4, at 9; FDA Chart, supra note 4.
9. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (1988); Eigo, supra note 4, at 9; FDA Chart, supra note 4.
10. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (1988); Eigo, supra note 4, at 9; FDA Chart, supra note 4.
11. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (1988); Eigo, supra note 4, at 9; FDA Chart, supra note 4. See
also Kleinfeld, Kaplan & Becker, Human Drug Regulation: Comprehensiveness Breeds Complexity,
in The Food and Drug Law Institute, ed., SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE VOL-
UME OF FOOD AND DRUG LAW (Washington, D.C.: The Food and Drug Law Institute, 1984), 242,
245 [hereinafter Kleinfeld].
12. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.1-50 (1988). See also Kleinfeld, supra note 11, at 265-68.
13. Wyngaarden, From the National Institutes of Health, 256 J. AM. MED. A. 2931 (1986).
14. See FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 706-07 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd,
532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976). See also 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (1972).
15. The issues raised by this possibility are beyond the scope of this paper, but would require
exploration of precedents for malpractice liability for deviational use of approved drugs and of the
boundaries of informed consent.
16. "These preliminary results leave open the possibility that RU 486 could be used as a once-a-
month fertility control agent, but they indicate that much work still has to be done to achieve this
goal." Baulieu, Contragestion by Antiprogestin: A New Approach to Human Fertility Control, in
The Ciba Foundation, ABORTION: MEDICAL PROGRESS AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS (London: Pit-
man, 1985), 192, 204 [hereinafter Baulieu].
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traception and abortion, and of whether the potential for its use as a
contraceptive should influence the legal classification of RU 486. Because
our legal framework does not specifically address the question of when
contraception becomes abortion, my discussion here is necessarily specula-
tive. To understand how the pill might be considered something other
than an abortifacient requires a basic understanding of what the pill does,
and how it differs from current methods of what the law treats as
contraception.
The chemical effect of RU 486 is not yet clear, but most researchers
believe that it ends pregnancy by interfering with the production of pro-
gesterone, a hormone required for the lining of the uterus to develop
properly into an environment that can nurture an embryo to develop-
ment.17 The pill is a synthetic steroid whose chemical structure resembles
the hormone progesterone sufficiently to "trick" the progesterone receptors
in the uterus, and thus block production of the real hormone."8 Without
progesterone, the lining of the uterus breaks down and is expelled, as in
normal menstruation. 9 If a fertilized egg, or what has evolved from a
fertilized egg, is present, it is expelled."0 The effectiveness of the pill has
been shown to be limited to the first seven weeks of pregnancy, or up to
about three weeks after a woman has missed her period.2"
The issue which determines whether a method of birth control is con-
sidered by law to be abortion or contraception appears to be at what point
in the process the outside agent interferes with potential birth. Conception
is considered by federal law to be a process, not a single event.2" Briefly, a
sperm fertilizes an egg, creating a zygote. Approximately seven days after
fertilization, the fertilized egg develops into a multi-celled blastocyst.2"
About half of fertilized eggs and what develops from them spontaneously
drop out of the uterus within two weeks.24 Implantation of the blasto-
17. Couzinet, Le Strat, Ulmann, Baulieu & Schaison, Termination of Early Pregnancy by the
Progesterone Antagonist RU 486 (Mifepristone), 315 NEW ENC. J. MED. 1565, 1568 (1986) [herein-
after Couzinet]. See also Kovacs, Sas, Resch, Ugocsai, Swahn, Bygdeman & Rowe, Termination of
Very Early Pregnancy by RU 486-An Antiprogestational Compound, 29 CONTRACEPTION 399,
400 (1984) [hereinafter Kovacs].
18. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 192-97.
19. Couzinet, supra note 17, at 1565-66.
20. See id.; Kovacs, supra note 17, at 400.
21. Couzinet, supra note 17, at 1567-68. "It is possible that the results are better in early preg-
nancy because progesterone originates mostly from the corpus luteum during this period .... After
about 49 days of amenorrhea, implantation is better established and the placenta produces a consider-
able local amount of progesterone, which may be more difficult to antagonize."
Medical researchers agree that while RU 486 administered with a prostaglandin increases its effec-
tiveness in the first 5-7 weeks of pregnancy (up to 95%), it does not prolong its effectiveness. The
success rate of RU 486 alone in 8-10 week pregnancies was 50% complete abortion, 35% incomplete
abortion, and 15% no effect at all. All women for whom the drug was unsuccesful received surgical
abortions. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 198-99.
22. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161.
23. Robert D. Goldstein, MOTHER-LOVE AND ABORTION (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1988),
105.
24. Id. at 7.
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cyst-if it hasn't dropped out-into the uterine wall also begins about a
week after fertilization.25 The implanted blastocyst develops into an em-
bryo, and is called an embryo from about the third to the eighth week.'
Forms of birth control recognized as contraception act at many different
points in this process. Spermicides and barrier methods prevent fertiliza-
tion. An oral contraceptive ("the Pill") usually prevents fertilization by
suppressing ovulation, but some forms of "the Pill" can also prevent im-
plantation.2 7 The IUD, whose efficacy at preventing birth is still not
clearly comprehended, is understood to act at several phases. Put simply,
the IUD interferes with the uterine environment sufficiently to prevent
implantation. The presence of a foreign object within the uterine environ-
ment causes white blood cell migration, cells which presumably attack the
blastocyst. Many IUD's also contain progesterone inhibitors, which, like
RU 486, interfere with the production of progesterone in the uterus. Ad-
ditionally, some IUDs are copper, which increases their effectiveness be-
cause copper ions are toxic to both sperm and blastocyst. The effect of the
IUD can also be to disrupt the implanted blastocyst from the uterine
lining.28
Medical knowledge is not easily translated into legal standards. The
chemical effect of RU 486 is medically different from the chemical and
mechanical effects of the IUD. However, for the purposes of enacting le-
gal standards, which evolve mainly by analogy, the effects of the two could
be considered substantially the same. The principal function of both the
IUD and RU 486 is to interfere with the nurturing uterine environment
sufficiently to prevent the continuation of pregnancy, and to instead in-
duce menstruation. The IUD can act at any stage up to and including
implantation of the blastocyst. If taken monthly, RU 486 would do the
same. The woman would take an RU 486 pill a few days before the ex-
pected date of menstruation. If there were no fertilized egg, the pill would
merely induce menstruation. If a fertilized egg were present, the pill
would prevent implantation by flushing it out with the uterine lining. If a
blastocyst were in the process of implanting, or if it were implanted, it too
would be flushed out in the menstrual flow.2 9
Monthly use of RU 486, still a remote possibility, may fit within fed-
eral law governing contraception. Since federal regulation treats the IUD
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 105.
27. Kaye, Are You for RU-486?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1986, at 13, 15 [hereinafter
Kaye].
28. Robert A. Hatcher, Felicia Guest, Felicia Stewart, Gary K. Stewart, James Trussel, Sylvia
Cerel & Willard Cates, CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1986-87, 13th ed. (New York: Irvington
Publishers, 1986), 191-92.
29. The inventor of RU 486, Etienne-Emile Baulieu, objects to the term "contraception" being
applied to the pill, since the word's roots suggest action to prevent conception-contra-conception.
Instead, he prefers the word "contragestion," since the pill's function is to prevent the gestational
environment from developing. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 192.
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as contraception, not abortion, and RU 486 taken as a monthly antifer-
tility agent would intervene at roughly the same time in the conception
process as an IUD, the pill's monthly use could arguably be contraceptive.
While the effects of the two are similar, for the analogy to be coherent,
the FDA might also consider the intent of the pill's user to be relevant to
its legal classification.
While intent in this context is largely a legal fiction, for the law to
comprehend RU 486 as a contraceptive device would require that the in-
tent imputed to the monthly RU 486 user be similar to the intent of the
IUD user. The IUD user intends to prevent pregnancy. She is aware at
the time the device is inserted by her doctor that it may prevent implanta-
tion, or as a back-up function, perhaps disrupt implantation. The monthly
RU 486 user would have a conditional intent: she would intend to end her
pregnancy, if she were pregnant, or to induce normal menstruation, if she
were not. The only difference between the intentions of the two users
would be in their understanding of the principal function of the antifer-
tility device. The RU 486 user would know that the pill was designed to
disrupt the implanted blastocyst, and that its other effects would be sec-
ondary to this principal function. The IUD user, on the other hand,
would know that the device was designed to prevent implantation, and
would disrupt implantation only on those occasions when the device's
principal function has failed. This subtle distinction in the intentions of
the users may not be sufficient to justify classification of the pill, when
used monthly, as an abortifacient, while at the same time allowing the
IUD to be considered a contraceptive.
Should RU 486 be approved in the United States as a monthly antifer-
tility device, the Court's articulations in Griswold v. Connecticut" and
Eisenstadt v. Baird31 of a married couple's or individual's rights to pri-
vacy would protect a woman's access to the pill from state interference.32
If the FDA classified the pill as a contraceptive, its use in the United
States, should it be introduced here, could be legally insulated from Su-
preme Court action on abortion. Federal regulation of contraceptives is
limited to their initial entrance into the market, when the FDA approves
the drug and its labeling, and to requirements that some contraceptives,
such as "the Pill" and the IUD, be prescribed by doctors."3 The conse-
quences, then, of a decision by the FDA to approve RU 486 as a contra-
ceptive, should it approve the drug at all, would be dramatic. 4
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
32. See infra Section V and accompanying notes for a discussion of how privacy doctrine as de-
fined in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), would protect
access to the pill from state interference should it be approved by the FDA as an abortion method.
33. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.501(a), 502 (1988).
34. The inventor of RU 486 hopes that one day women will be able to purchase the pill at
supermarkets. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 209-10. Though this is not likely to happen in the United
1989]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Even if the RU 486 pill were one day developed to be used as a
monthly contraceptive device, however, the likelihood of the FDA's con-
sidering it to be anything other than an abortion pill is remote. Two inter-
related issues would probably distinguish the pill from existing methods of
contraception: timing and intent. While the pill may be prescribed by a
doctor with instructions to the woman to take it monthly, the FDA might
be motivated to classify the pill as an abortifacient because of the possibil-
ity that the woman might take it less frequently, i.e., only when her pe-
riod was late, and she feared pregnancy. In short, given RU 486's poten-
tial to be used as an abortifacient, the FDA, in the current climate, would
probably consider it to be nothing but an abortion pill.
The timing of the pill's ingestion implicates the second factor militating
against its classification by the FDA as a contraceptive, the woman's in-
tent. If taken at the time prescribed, which is several days prior to the
expected onset of menstruation, her intent is at best ambiguous: to cause
menstruation whether or not she is pregnant. But the possibility that the
pill could be taken subsequent to the prescribed time means that she
would be able to form and act on an intent to abort, under the guise of
contraception. Despite the possible factual similarity of the effects of RU
486 and of an IUD, the pill's potential to be used intentionally as an
abortifacient would probably be dispositive. Use of RU 486, even if ap-
proved as a monthly antifertility agent, would most likely be governed by
federal abortion law, rather than the less intrusive law which governs con-
traception. The more relevant inquiry, then, is how the federal law of
abortion would apply to RU 486.
IV. RU 486 AND EXISTING ABORTION LAW: Roe v. Wade
The new French abortion pill, if used as a chemical inducement of
early abortion, fits easily within current federal law guiding the states'
legislative regulation of abortion. The Court's historic 1973 opinion, Roe
v. Wade, set maximum levels of permissible state intrusion on a doctor's
right to decide with his3 5 pregnant patient whether to terminate her preg-
nancy. The pill's introduction within the United States for use as an abor-
tifacient presents no legal difficulties within the Roe scheme.
The Roe decision identified three interests which are present at all
stages of a woman's pregnancy: maternal privacy, maternal health, and
potential life. The Court held that a state's choice of when and how to
regulate a doctor's freedom to recommend abortion to his pregnant patient
States, it is a scenario that some women's health advocates might find disturbing, and raises questions
about whether women's health interests coincide with the ambitions of the pill's chief proponent.
35. I use the pronouns "he" and "his" to refer to the doctor throughout the discussion of Roe
because I think the 1973 Court was conscious that most doctors then were men, and that this fact was
significant to the Court's determination that the doctor should play a critical role in a woman's deci-
sion to have an abortion.
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should be guided throughout her pregnancy by the state's interest in pre-
serving the woman's health."6 The Court limited the additional factors
that a state can rely on, should the state decide to regulate abortion. All
state schemes for regulation of abortion must first respect the woman's
right to privacy within the doctor/patient relationship as it pertains to her
decision to abort."1 The second additional factor, not mandatory but at the
state's option, is a permissible state interest in protecting potential human
life."'
The state's interest in the woman's health is paramount through all
stages of the woman's pregnancy. According to the logic of Roe, the two
factors of privacy and potential life are subordinate throughout a woman's
pregnancy to the state's interest in preserving the woman's health. Each of
the three factors is nevertheless recognized as being present at all stages of
pregnancy. To state the Court's decision in crude adversarial terms, the
factor presumed to "trump" the others, privacy or potential life, is the
state's interest in the pregnant woman's health. Since the interest in the
woman's health dominates throughout, actions taken by the woman, pred-
icated on her right to privacy, or actions taken by the state, predicated on
its interest in potential human life, are permissible only when they coin-
cide with the state interest in her health, a determination made by her
doctor.
According to the Roe balance of permissible interests, the state's interest
in the woman's health is served by her doctor's decision to recommend
abortion in the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy because the Court found
that surgical abortions during that period were safer for a pregnant wo-
man than carrying the pregnancy to term. 9 Accordingly, during the first
trimester, the woman's decision to abort her pregnancy is protected from
state regulation by the alignment of the state's interest in her health with
her right to privacy. Because surgical abortions in the second trimester
were not necessarily safer than giving birth, Roe held that the state's in-
terest in protecting a woman's health was furthered by allowing state reg-
ulation, but only when reasonably related to preservation of her health.4
In the third trimester, the state's overriding interest in the woman's health
can be served by no regulation, or by regulation to the same extent as the
state has legislated for the second trimester, such as limitations on abor-
tion facilities or medical personnel. It is only in the third trimester that
the Roe balancing of interests allows a state to enact into law its cogni-
zance of the third possible concern, the state's interest in potential life, an
optional interest which only at fetal viability is sufficient justification to
36. 410 U.S. at 163-66.
37. Id. at 164.
38. Id. at 150.
39. Id. at 163.
40. Id.
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limit a woman's fundamental privacy right. 1 Interest in the pregnant wo-
man's health, however, remains the dominant state interest. Even in the
third trimester, if the state's interest in protecting potential life conflicts
with its interest in preserving the woman's health, a determination made
by her doctor, the state cannot prohibit access to abortion."2
In terms of abortion law, the strongest legacy of the reasoning of the
Roe decision is that throughout a woman's pregnancy, the state's primary
interest is in preserving the woman's health. The decision did not pre-
scribe any regulation of abortion during the second and third trimesters,
but merely located the interests a state could rely on should it choose to
enact a regulatory scheme at all. The final mandate of the Roe decision is
defined in negative terms: no state may interfere with the freedom of a
physician to decide with a woman that she should abort her pregnancy in
the first trimester.'3
The new French abortion pill fits comfortably within both the positive
and negative mandates of Roe. If taken orally as an abortifacient, use of
the pill should be protected from state interference because it fulfills the
state's interest in protecting a woman's health: abortion induced chemi-
cally by RU 486, taken in conjunction with a prostaglandin, is tentatively
considered by medical researchers to have some side effects, but to be a
safer procedure than surgical abortion for terminating early pregnancy.""
Use of the pill may prove to be more effective than surgical abortion in
fulfilling the state's interest in a pregnant woman's health because it does
not carry the attendant risks of surgery, including anesthesia.' 5
Introduction of RU 486 to induce abortions would not require states to
adjust existing regulations of abortion because the privacy interest which
prevails in the first trimester of abortion would protect a doctor's discre-
tion to prescribe RU 486. Use of RU 486 is for medical reasons limited to
well within the first trimester of pregnancy. In clinical trials, the effective-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 163-64.
43. Id. at 164.
44. Kolata, Boycott Threat Blocking Sale of Abortion-Inducing Drug, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1988,
at Al, col. 3 [hereinafter Kolata]. According to Chinese and European researchers, prostaglandins
taken together with RU 486 reduce the side effects that either drug has when given alone. Pros-
taglandins alone, used in the United States for later than first trimester abortions, can cause nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea and severe abdominal cramps. RU 486 alone has caused severe bleeding and in-
complete abortion, which increases the risk of infection. Because the prostaglandin dosage is much
smaller when taken in conjunction with RU 486, most of its side effects are eliminated. Id.
In an article published in 1985, the pill's inventor reported that there had been excessive bleeding
in three of 200 women given RU 486 alone, but in none when it was administered in conjunction
with a prostaglandin. Balieu, supra note 16, at 209.
45. Couzinet, supra note 17, at 1569. In this recent study of RU 486, the researchers cautioned
that the current form of the drug should only be used under close medical supervision because of the
possibility of failed abortion (about 15% when RU 486 is used alone) and prolonged uterine bleeding.
They wrote, "Even with these reservations, however, RU 486 offers a reasonable alternative to surgi-




ness of the pill has been shown to be limited to the first seven weeks of
pregnancy, or up to three weeks after a woman has missed her period."' It
is coincidental that the pill's temporally limited usefulness corresponds
with the phase of pregancy least regulated by the prevailing American law
of abortion. Because the pill can currently only be used in the first trimes-
ter, the decision to opt for a chemically induced abortion would be pro-
tected by the alignment in the Roe decision of the state's interest in the
woman's health and the woman's right to privacy.
But use of RU 486 would fall even more particularly within the con-
ception of privacy that is unique to Roe. In Roe, the Court announced
that the previously articulated right to privacy was broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision to abort her pregnancy. 47 But the language of
the Roe decision is fraught with limitations. Throughout the decision,
Justice Blackmun emphasized the essential role to be played by the doctor
in the decision to abort, so that the right to privacy inheres not just in the
woman, but rather in her relationship with her doctor.48 Because she is
pregnant, "the woman's privacy is no longer sole."' 9 The Court deliber-
ately circumscribed the privacy right so it was contained within the realm
of medical judgment by holding that "the attending physician, in consulta-
tion with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State,
that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be
terminated." 0
The privacy that the decision protects is reminiscent of the privacy that
cloaks the attorney/client relationship, a model which surely resonated
with the Court. In the ideal attorney/client relationship, the client
presents a problem, to which the attorney responds with all available legal
courses of action. Roe protects the right of physicians to make an exhaus-
tive medical recommendation, i.e., to provide a pregnant patient with both
available medical options: medical treatment needed to carry the baby to
term, or medical treatment needed to abort. While the client/patient
makes the decision, the professional shapes the choices and carries some of
the responsibility for the ultimate decision. In fact, the Court in Roe ex-
ceeded the limits of this model by allocating near total responsibility to the
physician. The Court held that "the abortion decision, in all its aspects is
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for
it must rest with the physician."61 The Roe decision is built on the legal
fiction of a close and confidential doctor/patient relationship, and the pri-
46. Balieu, supra note 16, at 198.
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
48. This conception of the privacy right deviates from prior privacy holdings in which the right to
privacy was found to inhere in the individual. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
49. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
50. Id. at 163.
51. Id. at 166.
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vacy right that the decision protects reflects this, since it is shared by the
physician and the woman.52
Nonetheless, the legal fiction of the close association of doctor and pa-
tient upon which Roe bestows the protection of privacy comports with the
reality of the most probable use of RU 486. The pill's current use in
France is a reliable guide to its use in the United States, should it be
introduced into the U.S. market. In France, the pill is prescribed by a
doctor, and ingested within the hospital.5" Following her ingestion of the
pill, the pregnant woman is treated as an outpatient. Doctors monitor the
effects of the pill, and perform a follow-up check-up for tissue remaining
in the uterus. If the pill does not affect the woman's pregnancy, or if it
does not induce a complete abortion, as it sometimes does not, a doctor
performs a surgical abortion. 4 Under current use of the pill, then, doctors
remain integrally involved in the decision to use the pill, since they must
prescribe it and remain in close contact with their patients after they take
it because of the possibility of its failure to induce a complete abortion. 5
The Roe concept of privacy, because it protects the doctor/patient rela-
tionship from state interference when, in the doctor's opinion, abortion is
a medically responsible course of action, easily encompasses the use of the
pill as a doctor-prescribed abortifacient. The Roe concept of privacy pro-
tects the doctor's right to recommend to his patient any of the treatment
options which he knows to be available. If RU 486 were available in the
United States, the use of the pill would, if current practices in France are
a guide, necessarily include the medical decision Roe envisioned.5"
While the Roe concept of privacy is broad enough to encompass use of
the new pill, the decision protected by the woman's privacy right would be
different. In the image which motivated the Roe decision, the doctor is free
in the first trimester to make a medical judgment that either abortion or
birth is more appropriate for the patient. With RU 486, the privacy con-
cept would protect the doctor's freedom in the first trimester to make a
medical judgment that either surgical or chemical abortion (or birth) was
52. Whether this notion of the physician/patient relationship corresponds with the reality of
women outside the middle and upper class is extremely doubtful. More likely, it reflects the relation-
ships of the Justices with their doctors.
53. Langone, After-the-Fact Birth Control: Abortion Pills, Approved Abroad, Are Doubtful for
the U.S., TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 103.
54. Id.
55. As noted earlier, supra note 21, RU 486, even when taken in conjunction with a pros-
taglandin, is at best 95% effective in terminating pregnancies of 5-7 weeks.
56. Clearly. doctors may be involved for a longer period of time when a woman chooses to have a
chemical over a surgical abortion. Use of RU 486 in France has been limited until recently to clinical
experiments. While under clinical conditions medical surveillance probably exceeds the medical in-
volvement necessary for non-experimental use, a woman's contact with the clinic was at minimum six
visits: four times to ingest the RU 486 dosage, once to have a prostaglandin administered, and once to
follow up on the effects. Much depends on the dosage of RU 486; in some tests, it has been adminis-
tered for as little as two days, in others up to four days, in either one or two doses per day. Finally,
some women have required surgical abortion. See generally Baulieu, supra note 16; Couzinet, supra
note 17; Kovacs, supra note 17.
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more appropriate for the patient. Because the decision to use a chemical
abortifacient would involve a doctor, and because availability of chemical
abortion would be a treatment option which the doctor should be able to
prescribe where appropriate, use of the pill parallels the motivating image
of Roe.
V. HOME USE OF RU 486 AND THE Griswold RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Court's decision in Roe expounded, but did not create, the consti-
tutional right to privacy. In a more recent case, Justice Blackmun has
explained that the privacy right developed by the Court has two distinct
strains: a decisional aspect, and a locational aspect. 7 Roe, as I have ex-
plained, is an example of the first.5" The woman's decision to abort, made
with her doctor, is a private decision, not to be touched by state regulation
in the first trimester. Like the decision to abort surgically, the decision to
use RU 486 fits within the decisional aspect of the privacy right. The
locational aspect of the privacy right, which informed the Court's original
announcement of a constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connect-
icut, is the Court's recognition that a person's home, and the activities
within the home, deserve special protection in constitutional law. Unlike
surgical abortion, however, the anticipated use of RU 486 fits also within
the Court's locational aspect of privacy because of the possibility that a
woman could take the pill as an outpatient within her own home.
The constitutional right to privacy, as it was first articulated in Gris-
wold, was invoked to protect a married couple's access to contraception.59
The Griswold Court held that the Constitution contains a right to pri-
vacy, located in any or all of several different provisions, including the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, and particularly in
the penumbra of peripheral rights without which those specifically
granted by the Bill of Rights would be less secure.60 While the textual
grounding of the right to privacy is not precisely pinpointed in Griswold,
57. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. The Court's most recent decisional privacy holding, Bowers, declined to extend the right to
privacy to the decision made by homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy. The Court held that
that decision by homosexuals did not implicate the traditional activities to which privacy extends, a list
which includes family, marriage, and procreation. While the Court discussed the special protection
that one's home has had in constitutional doctrine, it held that because homosexual relations have "no
connection" to traditional privacy concepts, the occurrence within the home was not sufficient on its
own to immunize otherwise illegal conduct. Id. at 191.
The Court's holding, as Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, misapplied earlier privacy decisions
by dismissing the locational aspect of privacy. Id. at 206. In his powerful dissent, Blackmun also
criticized the Court for skirting the reasons why we protect family-related decisions-because these
decisions "form so central a part of an individual's life." Id. at 204.
Despite Bowers' limited conception of privacy, use of RU 486 would nonetheless be consistent with
the Bowers holding. Unless use of the pill were specifically made illegal, which would require a
change in the law not yet proposed, the pill's use would be within the decisional aspect of privacy,
which Bowers reaffirmed to include decisions relating to procreation.
59. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
60. Id. at 484.
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the state invasion of that right, against which the Court sought to protect
private citizens, is graphically sketched. The image which motivated the
Court's holding is the specter of the state invading the privacy of the mar-
ital bedroom. 6 In what could be called a fear of the enforcement possibili-
ties, the Court struck down the state law prohibiting possession of contra-
ceptives to protect the marital bedroom from unreasonable searches. The
Court recoiled collectively at the nightmarish possibility of the law's en-
forcement: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage rela-
tionship." 2 While the Court grounded the right to privacy variously in
Constitutional provisions, the motivating image is grounded firmly in the
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches: a state search
for contraceptives would be unreasonable because the marital relationship
is private and the location in which the marital relationship takes place,
the home, is private.63
Researchers involved in the study of RU 486 project that the pill may
soon be available for use in the home. 4 Use in the home is anticipated to
take either or both of two forms: monthly, as a menstruation inducer, or
periodically, also as a menstruation inducer, but only when the woman
thinks she might be pregnant.
Periodic home use of the pill, still just a possibility, is envisioned to be
similar to use of other prescription medicines. Within one to three weeks
of a missed period,65 the woman would get a doctor's prescription for RU
486, and most likely a prostaglandin, which she would fill at a phar-
macy.66 It is also possible that she would have the prescription on hand,
having earlier received a supply prescription. She could then return home,
or remain home if she were using a supply prescription, and take a single
pill."7 Approximately two days later, she would either return to her doctor
for a prostaglandin injection, or insert a prostaglandin suppository. 8
Within a few days of ingesting the pill, she would begin bleeding as if she
had a heavy menstrual period, and would continue bleeding for seven to
61. Id. at 485.
62. Id. at 485-86. While the Connecticut law which the opinion struck down was not in fact
enforced in this way, the image of police in the marital bedroom is central to the Griswold holding.
63. Id. at 484.
64. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 209. In his 1985 report, the inventor of the pill said, "I believe that
we will have a successful recipe for a safe, self-administered compound in a few years, but we haven't
got it yet."
65. Id. at 198. Research results have been more successful for 5-7 week pregnancies than for 8-10
week pregnancies. See supra note 21.
66. See Baulieu, supra note 16. Prostaglandins are already on the market in the United States,
approved by the FDA for inducing abortion after the first trimester. Kolata, supra note 44.
67. Couzinet, supra note 17, at 1569. Though in many studies of RU 486 researchers have used
multiple doses of the drug, in this recent article the researchers stated, "[A] single dose may be suffi-
cient .... This would make treatment with RU 486 more convenient."
68. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 209; Kolata, supra note 44.
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fourteen days, after which she would require a follow-up visit to her doc-
tor to ensure that her uterus was empty.69
As mentioned above, the effectiveness of RU 486, even taken with the
addition of a prostaglandin, is limited to approximately the first seven
weeks of pregnancy, or up to three weeks after the woman's period was
due.7 0 In the scenario for periodic home use sketched above, the woman
who had the prescription on hand would have to know that she should not
use the pill after seven weeks. The above example also leaves open the
possibility that the woman is not actually pregnant. If the pill is self-
administered when the woman's period is up to a few weeks late, it is
possible that the physical circumstance is not pregnancy, but simply that
her period is late, although the availability of home pregnancy test kits
makes such a mistaken assumption less probable. 1
The projected home use of the pill is consistent with the Griswold con-
cept of privacy, which grants special protection under the Constitution to
certain activities that take place within the privacy of one's home. Used
either as a periodically prescribed pill, when a woman's pregnancy is con-
firmed, or as a prescribed pill periodically ingested when a woman be-
lieves pregnancy is a possibility, the woman could take the pill on her
own, in her own home. This anticipated use of RU 486 comports with the
spatial aspect of the Griswold privacy right. The woman need not travel
to a clinic for the actual abortion, or undergo anesthesia or surgery." The
precipitating act would be a spatially private one.
Abstract legal concepts are more easily integrated into our common un-
derstanding when they can be visualized. The image of a woman taking a
pill is easy to visualize because it is an experience that is shared by any-
one who has ever taken an aspirin. Psychologically, then, the use of RU
486 is more easily placed within common notions of privacy than is surgi-
cal abortion, since the physical act of taking a pill within one's own home
is within the common understanding of private acts performed at home.
Though doctors remain indispensible to the RU 486 process, the scenario
has the hallmark of Griswold's locational privacy because it can take place
in the home."' Doctors might have been involved in Griswold in a similar
69. Kovacs, supra note 17, at 402.
70. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 198. The prostaglandin dosage would cause uterine contractions.
Taken in conjunction with RU 486, prostaglandins both increase the probability of the woman's
expelling all of the abortive material, and decrease the possibility of excessive bleeding. Kolata, supra
note 44.
71. See supra Section III and accompanying notes for a discussion of the role of intent in the legal
classification of the pill.
72. Couzinet, supra note 17, at 1569; Baulieu, supra note 16, at 198. This is obviously not true
for every potential RU 486 user. Some women's pregnancies have not been affected by RU 486, and
others have required surgical abortion as a back-up to fully evacuate the uterus.
73. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold locational privacy certainly does not
protect all activities that might take place in the home. In Griswold, the privacy of a married couple's
decision and the privacy of its site reinforced one another as reasons to proclaim the couple's use of
contraceptives to be free from government interference. The couple would not be free to have sex in
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manner by prescribing the contraceptives in question. The presence of
doctors in the RU 486 scenario, both to prescribe the pill, and to perform
a follow-up medical check-up, does not then mitigate its association with
the privacy of one's home.
Importantly, the pill's use in the home would conjure the same enforce-
ment nightmare that motivated the Court's holding in Griswold. In Gris-
wold, the Court reacted to the possibility of state enforcement of a law
prohibiting married couples from possessing contraceptives via state
searches of marital bedrooms by invalidating the state law. The Court
made it clear in a subsequent decision which extended Griswold on equal
protection grounds, Eisenstadt v. Baird, that an unmarried person's
posession of contraceptives was also protected by her privacy rights. 4 It
was not the contraceptive possessor's concurrent possession of a marriage
certificate that elevated the scenario into the constitutional sphere. Rather,
the privacy that the Court was protecting was based on the decision and
the place itself, the person's home.
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL STATE INTERVENTION
Should RU 486 be federally approved for sale in the United States, a
state probably could not limit a doctor's decision to prescribe it. Once the
federal government approved the pill, if a state wished to pass laws
prohibiting possession of the pill, the motivating image which the Gris-
wold and Eisenstadt decisions cloaked with privacy should protect home
use of RU 486. Enforcement of the anti-contraceptive laws violated the
person's privacy rights because the laws invited the state into the intimate
realm of procreation and the private space of the home. State intrusion on
a woman's private act of taking the pill would constitute a similar
violation.
Nor could a state, once RU 486 were approved by the FDA, prohibit
prescription or use of the drug on the basis of the state's interest in mater-
nal health, despite its being the dominant interest throughout all stages of
a woman's pregnancy. It is only once the pregnancy progresses to the sec-
ond trimester that federal abortion law permits the state interest in mater-
nal health to be enacted into law, allowing regulation of abortion only if it
"reasonably relates to preservation and protection of the pregnant wo-
man's health."17 ' The uses of RU 486 would, for medical reasons, be lim-
ited to the first trimester-that stage of pregnancy insulated from state
regulation that infringes on the woman's privacy-based right to choose
abortion.
public, for example. Nor, according to Bowers, are citizens necessarily free to make the decision to
have consensual homosexual sodomy in their homes. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
74. 405 U.S. at 453.
75. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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A state might attempt to elude the federal proscription of regulation for
safety until after the first trimester by arguing that the health risks associ-
ated with chemical abortion are different from those involved in surgical
abortion, and that therefore, the scheme devised by Roe to deal with surgi-
cal abortion should be expanded to allow health regulations in the first
trimester. The Court allowed state regulation of second trimester abor-
tions because at the time Roe was decided, the mortality rate of abortion
was less than the mortality rate of childbirth only until the end of the first
trimester. 7' The significant comparison, then, would be the safety of an
RU 486 abortion to the safety of childbirth, measured by mortality rates.
Since the state law posited here would not arise until the FDA had ap-
proved use of RU 486, the exhaustive FDA determination of the pill's
safety would probably be dispositive in that it is unlikely the FDA would
approve a first-trimester abortion method demonstrated to be less safe
than childbirth. The assessment of safety, then, would already have been
made at the federal level.
The Court's holding in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth" supports
the conclusion that the safety of a form of abortion is not presumed to be a
single state's determination. The Court in Danforth struck down a Mis-
souri law which had prohibited the performance of one form of abortion
on the basis of the state's interest in maternal health. 78 The Supreme
Court found that the state had deviated from national norms of safety by
prohibiting saline abortions, "an accepted medical prodecure in this coun-
try," 79 and that saline abortions were safer for a woman than giving
birth."0 The Danforth language, in dicta, leaves open the possibility that
if a state could show that the abortion method it wished to prohibit were
not as safe as other forms of abortion used at the same stage of pregnancy,
and could show that the other forms were available within the state, such
a prohibition might be constitutional. Under Roe, however, this possiblity
of prohibiting a relatively less safe abortion method would probably not be
an option for a state wishing to prohibit RU 486 because the state would
have to show that the mortality rate of an RU 486 abortion in the first
trimester was higher than that of childbirth-an issue which presumably
would have been resolved in the FDA approval process.
Nor would a state prevail by arguing that its attempt to prohibit RU
486 was merely a minor health regulation which did not interfere with a
woman's right to abortion, akin to the record-keeping requirements found
permissible in Danforth for the first trimester.81 Considering the state's
76. Id.
77. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
78. Id. at 79.
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id. at 76-78.
81. Id. at 81.
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prohibition of RU 486 against the backdrop of the federal determination
of safety, the Court could, as it did in Danforth, look beyond the proffered
state justification to discern its genuine intent, i.e., to see if the state really
intended to impermissibly burden a woman's right to abortion."2
VII. RESISTANCE TO AND SUPPORT FOR RU 486 IN THE UNITED
STATES
If the law were our moral guide, resistance to the abortion pill's intro-
duction into the United States would be minimal. Yet it is not. Vocal
opposition to the pill has been heard from people who are opposed to any
form of abortion. While feminists are supportive of new birth control de-
velopments,83 some, among them those who are reluctant to endorse chem-
ical forms of birth control, have reservations about the long-term dangers
of this new form.""
It is the dream of Etienne-Emile Baulieu, the inventor of RU 486, that
his pill will remove the word "abortion" from common usage by eliminat-
ing the need for the things we currently associate with abortion: the clin-
ics, surgery, anesthesia."5 Many anti-abortionists share with Baulieu the
belief that widespread use of his pill could remove abortion from the clin-
ics to the home, but what is a dream for the pill's inventor may be an
anti-abortionist's nightmare, for abortion in the home might well be be-
yond the reach of the pro-life movement.
Anti-abortionists recoil at the potential trivialization of abortion if it
can be had in a pill. It is too easy. Their fear is that the ease of the
instigating action, swallowing a pill, would dilute the moral significance
of the act.8 6 A pro-life Congressman sent a "Dear Colleague" letter in
1986 urging support for a limitation on federal funding for testing of the
pill: "The proponents of abortion want to replace the guilt suffered by
women who undergo abortion with the moral uncertainty of self-decep-
tion. Imagine, with the 'death pill,' the taking of a pre-born life will be as
easy and as trivial as taking aspirin."8" In the minds of the anti-abortion-
ists, if abortion can be had in a pill, a woman would no longer need to
82. Id. at 79.
83. I interviewed 15 women who work in the reproductive health field and describe themselves as
feminists for their views on RU 486. Janet Gallagher, an expert on reproductive health law, empha-
sized the sobering effect of seeing contraceptive research slow down in the wake of successful products
liability litigation against some manufacturers of contraceptives, an unfortunate byproduct of such
litigation. Telephone interview (Feb. 1989).
84. Telephone interview with Lynn Paltrow, staff attorney for the ACLU Reproductive Freedom
Project (Nov. 1988).
85. Kaye, supra note 27, at 14. The executive vice president of Planned Parenthood said recently,
"This drug or some similar compound will be available here someday, and when it is, it will usher in
the end of the abortion debate in America." Abrams, Politics, Profits and a Pill, N.Y. Newsday, Dec.
13, 1988, Discovery section at 1.
86. Thomas, supra note 6, at 3.
87. Dornan, Death Pill, Dear Colleague Letter to Congress (July 29, 1986) (on file with author).
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travel to a clinic for surgery, to wait surrounded by other anxious women,
some crying, some changing their minds. The anti-abortionists fear that
the act in the home could follow the formation of intent too quickly to give
the act its moral significance.88 They fear that women would no longer
risk traversing the moral barriers of their picket lines, with their graphic
literature and photographs, to get an abortion.89
Anti-abortionists may also fear that there would no longer be sites for
their picket lines. In recent years, the pro-life movement has adopted civil
disobedience, the morally compelling tactic of the American civil rights
movement, to protest abortion at clinics where it is performed. The poten-
tial for RU 486 to decentralize the act of abortion from clinics to homes
would deprive the right-to-life movement of its most concrete rallying
points. Women who go to clinics for abortions often have to face chanting
demonstrators who decry their actions. Women who abort in the home
would not.
Anti-abortionists fear that the decentralization of abortion would in-
crease its identification with privacy. Abortion in the home, even with
medical supervision, would carry the special status that we attach to activ-
ities within home. While the identification of surgical abortion with pri-
vacy may be an elusive concept for many people, connecting home pill-
abortion with privacy is less difficult, since we consider our homes to be
private spheres.
Most significant from a political standpoint, anti-abortionists fear that
the introduction of RU 486 would erode the strength of their movement.
Opposition to abortion increases as pregnancy progresses, and many who
oppose surgical abortion are less sympathetic to the moral claims of right-
to-lifers when termination of pregnancy is closer to fertilization.9" The
significant proportion of people whose views on abortion do not fall into
either camp may respond positively to early abortion in the home, poten-
tially marginalizing a polarized right-to-life view from mainstream
debate.
Both the pill's researchers and anti-abortionists believe the pill has the
potential to reshape the abortion controversy. It is the researchers' hope,
and the pro-lifers' fear. But many feminists doubt that RU 486 would
88. Cahill, 'Abortion Pill' RU 486: Ethics, Rhetoric, and Social Practice, 17 HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT 5, 5 (1987) [hereinafter Cahill]. Cahill expressed concern that accessibility of RU 486 would
discourage self-critical abortion decisions and reflection on the relation of abortion to other forms of
killing.
89. John Wilke, president of the National Right to Life Committee, has acknowledged that the
photographs of aborted remains which have been a galvanizing tool for right-to-life activists would be
less compelling if use of RU 486 became widespread because early embryos are not visually identifi-
able as human. Halpern, RU 486: The Unpregnancy Pill, Ms., Apr. 1987, at 56, 58 [hereinafter
Halpern].
90. Richard Glasow, education director for National Right to Life, has predicted that if propo-
nents of RU 486 are successful in identifying the drug with contraception, rather than solely with
abortion, right-to-life opposition could be seen as reactionary. Id.
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significantly alter the lines of the abortion controversy since surgical abor-
tion would still be a necessary alternative to the pill. For some who chose
to use RU 486, it might not work completely, and for a few, not at all."
It is significant that every woman who has participated in the clinical
studies of RU 486 has been required to agree to a surgical abortion
should the chemical not work, and that some have indeed had to use the
surgical back-up. 2 Moreover, the pill would only be useful for very early
abortions, up to seven weeks, and undoubtedly some women would fail to
seek an abortion in time to take the pill. Surgical abortion would remain
their only choice. Finally, even given the choice, many women would
probably choose surgical abortion over a new chemical form of abortion
since surgical abortion has proven to be both safe and effective.
Most critical to a number of feminists is the pill's safety. The optimism
of researchers may be understandable, but it is suspect because of their
vested interest in seeing their ideas and inventions accepted. Feminists
concerned with the health of women fear a replay of the overly enthusias-
tic response which greeted oral contraceptives, an enthusiasm which led
millions of women to use "the Pill" without knowledge of its conse-
quences.9 3 Like RU 486, "the Pill" was marketed before adequate re-
search had been done to discover its long-term health consequences. 4
We should approach RU 486 with the precedent of the oral contracep-
tive's rapid endorsement by the medical profession in mind, and the more
general observation that women's bodies in our society are not as valuable
as men's. To date, research on RU 486 has been limited to tests of its
toxicity and efficacy. Some women have experienced side effects research-
ers may not consider serious, but should not be lightly dismissed. Several
women have bled excessively when given dosages first thought to be safe,
and some have hemorrhaged even with lower doses. 5 Several have exper-
ienced pain from uterine contractions, and others have experienced dizzi-
91. See supra note 21.
92. Id.
93. "In 1965, nearly one third of all American women who ever used any method of contraception
reported having used the pill, consuming progestogen and estrogen tablets at the rate of 2660 tons
yearly .... By early 1969, 20 preparations differing in chemical composition, absolute quantity, and
proportion of ingredients were being distributed in the U.S. at the rate of 8.5 million cycles per
month." Harry W. Rudel, Fred A. Kincl & Milan R. Henzl, BIRTH CONTROL: CONTRACEPTION
AND ABORTION (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1973), 90. Among the side effects already known to
researchers by 1973 were anxiety, amenorrhea, acne, changes in libido, backache, breast enlargement
and tenderness, delayed menses, depression, dizziness, headache, leg cramps, nausea, pelvic cramps,
fatigue, and weight fluctuations. Id. at 130. Recent federal regulations require that patients be
warned about known dangers of oral contraceptives, including thrombophlebitis, stroke, links to can-
cer, and the specific dangers to smokers. See 21 C.F.R. 310.501(a)(2)(iv)-(vii).
94. See generally Morton Mintz, THE PILL: AN ALARMING REPORT (Boston: Beacon Press,
1970).
95. See Kaye, supra note 27, at 14; Pearson, RU 486: What Will It Mean for the Women's
Health Movement?, Unpublished Discussion Paper Presented at National Women's Health Move-
ment Board Meeting (Nov. 12, 1989) (on file with author). However, researchers have reported that
fewer women experienced excessive bleeding when RU 486 was used in conjunction with a pros-
taglandin. Baulieu, supra note 16, at 209.
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ness, fatigue and nausea."e Nor is the pill entirely successful in effecting a
complete abortion in all women. While the efficacy of RU 486 is in-
creased significantly when used in conjunction with a prostaglandin, there
remains the possibility of incomplete abortion, dangerous because of the
potential for the tissue remaining in the uterus to cause infection.
Though RU 486 is quickly flushed from a woman's system, making
long-term effects less likely, 7 feminists emphasize that a lack of long-term
effects must be proven, not assumed."8 The pill has only been tested for
toxicity and efficacy in the last few years, and I have not found any re-
search reporting on the pill's long-term effects." Many medications, oral
contraceptives among them, have had unforeseen long-term effects, and
feminists tend to be skeptical of the long-term safety risks of hormone-
related drugs.100 There may be special dangers for particular populations
that would come to light only after those populations had been adminis-
tered the drug. Questions that should be but have not been answered in-
clude: how does the pill affect other parts and systems of a woman's body?
How would RU 486 interact with other oral contraceptives? With other
medications? Will a woman who has had an RU 486 abortion have diffi-
culty becoming pregnant again? 1' If she is able to become pregnant
again, and wishes to carry the baby, will the child be affected by the
pill?10 2 These questions should be answered before the pill is marketed.
Some feminists discern a more abstract reason to hesitate before endors-
ing RU 486, centered, ironically, on the very privacy that other feminists
celebrate. While some feminists believe the increased privacy of chemical
abortion is "wonderful,"' ' others are concerned that the long feminist
struggle to identify private lives as political may be undermined by the
decentralization of abortion services. °'0 A corollary of privacy may be in-
ducement or exacerbation of feelings of guilt or shame. A woman who
aborted at home would not benefit from the supportive counseling offered
96. Halpern, supra, note 89, at 58; Cahill, supra note 88, at 5.
97. Marie Bass, Joanne Howes & Nanette Falkenberg, A REPORT ON RU 486 AND ITS PROS-
PECTS FOR USE IN THE UNITED STATES (Washington, D.C.: Bass and Howes, 1987), 15 [hereinafter
Bass].
98. Telephone interview with Judy Norsigian, Boston Women's Health Collective (Mar. 1989).
99. One published study included a follow-up checkup a month after the administration of the
drug, but limited the examination to testing for efficacy and infection. Couzinet, supra note 17, at
1566.
100. Telephone interview with Cindy Pearson, program director of the National Women's Health
Network (Feb. 1989).
101. One woman who participated in an RU 486 study got pregnant again soon after her RU 486
abortion, and returned to the researchers for a second dosage of the drug. Couzinet, supra note 17, at
1567.
102. While formal research in this area should be conducted, informal reporting to the drug's
manufacturer has shown that some women who chose to carry a subsequent pregnancy after having
an RU 486 abortion have had normal pregnancies. Bass, supra note 97, at 20.
103. Telephone interviews with Alice Kirkland, National Abortion Federation (Feb. 1989), and
Deborah Pastor, Chair, Reproductive Freedom Project of N.Y.C. NOW (Feb. 1989).
104. Telephone interview with Janet Gallagher (Feb. 1989).
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at some clinics, counseling which can lead to the politically significant
realization that she is not alone in needing an abortion. While the picket-
ers who line the sidewalks in front of abortion clinics can intimidate
women, they also politicize the private act of seeking an abortion.10 5 Abor-
tions in the home, out of sight of the public eye, may allow society to
avoid the fundamental role of reproductive autonomy in the "intensely
public question of the subordination of women to men through the ex-
ploitation of pregnancy." ' '
The level of ignorance about the long-term effects of RU 486 make it
premature to apply the adjective "safe," and the privacy that the pill
promises may not be wholly beneficial. The possibility of U.S. use of RU
486, however, must finally be considered in light of the political realities
of the current abortion debate, for anti-abortionists have not limited their
opposition to RU 486 to public statements and threatened boycotts, but
have also attempted through Congressional legislation to alter the alloca-
tion of federal funds in order to impede the FDA approval process.
A right-to-life congressman, Robert Dornan, has attempted to expand
the general ban on Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
funds' being expended for the performance of abortions to prevent FDA
consideration of RU 486 as an abortifacient, and has attempted to prevent
private research on its use as an abortifacient 01 Congressman Dornan
attempted unsuccessfully to amend the 1988 HHS appropriations bill to
prohibit the agency from using federal funds to consider a new drug ap-
plication for the abortifacient use of RU 486.108 His attempt, likely to be
repeated, to limit a federal agency's congressionally-mandated role with
regard to a single drug points to unresolved constitutional questions analo-
gous to those raised by the withdrawal of public facilities as places to
perform abortions, a question currently before the Supreme Court.10 9
105. These insights were shared by several women, none of whom wished to be quoted.
106. Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: The Founda-
tion Press, 1988), 1353.
107. While divisions of HHS can fund drug testing, none can currently test RU 486 for use as an
abortifacient. This is due to the general ban on HHS funds' being used to perform abortions except
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, a restriction
embodied in the "Hyde Amendment" that is added to the HHS appropriations bill each year. See Act
of Sept. 20, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-436, 102 Stat. 1680 § 204 (1988). Additionally, under HHS
policy for research involving human subjects, no federal funds may be used for research involving
pregnant women unless the risk to the fetus is minimal. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(a) (1988). These
general bans do not prohibit HHS funds from being used to test RU 486 for purposes other than
abortion.
The FDA decision to exempt RU 486 from its recently enacted policy allowing the mail importa-
tion of some unapproved drugs provides additional evidence of anti-choice activism targeted at federal
administrative bodies. See supra note 6.
108. 134 CONG. REC. H4234 (daily ed. June 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dornan).
109. One question presented by the abortion case scheduled to be heard this term by the Supreme
Court is the constitutionality of Missouri's termination of the use of public facilities for the perform-
ance of abortions. See 57 U.S.L.W. at 3441-42. Dornan's proposal raises a similar question because it
threatens to curtail indirect government support for abortion, as opposed to direct government fund-
ing. The withdrawal of direct government funding for abortion was held to be constitutional in Harris
[Vol. 1: 75
French Abortion Pill
Congressman Dornan's unsuccessful amendment would also have prohib-
ited HHS funds from being used to administer the FDA exemption pro-
cess that allows private research on the drug as an abortifacient to take
place within the United States. If the amendment had passed, the only
U.S. testing of RU 486 as an abortifacient, currently being conducted by
the Population Council, a privately funded non-profit organization, would
have been prohibited.
Against the background of right-to-life activity targeted to prevent RU
486 from reaching the United States, feminist concerns about autonomy
and choice become more urgent. Women's autonomy is founded on in-
creased control over our bodies, and the option of another form of abortion
gives us more control.11° Alice Kirkland, of the National Abortion Federa-
tion, stressed that we should trust women to make their own decisions, a
trust sometimes lacking even in feminist circles. 1 ' The remaining un-
known safety risks of RU 486 justify a feminist endorsement of further
testing before releasing the drug to the open market, but the possibility
that the American regulatory system could be prevented by anti-choice
activism from even considering the pill spurs a more immediate concern
for autonomy. The potential RU 486 holds to be developed as a safe alter-
native to surgical abortion should not be foreclosed by anti-abortionists'
pressure on those who determine the federal regulatory scheme. If the pill
proves to be safe, women should be given the choice to use it.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Current federal abortion law, with its trimester structure, is directly
threatened by the abortion case pending before the Supreme Court, Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services."' Assuming, however, that the
Court reaffirms the fundamental tenet of Roe, that abortion in the first
trimester should remain free from intrusive regulation by the state, the
most likely projected use of RU 486 in the United States, as an abortifa-
cient to be administered under close medical supervision after a pregnancy
is confirmed, is well within the embrace of the constitutional framework.
The remote possibility of RU 486's introduction as a monthly antifertility
drug would also be well within abortion law, and perhaps would allow
RU 486 to be treated under law as a contraceptive.
The controversy over RU 486 highlights a common but disquieting ob-
servation about existing abortion law, even as one can see how the pill
would easily fit into that law: it does not satisfy either side. Roe was a
political decision, in the sense that politics is a balancing of interests and
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
110. Telephone interview with Deborah Pastor, Chair, Reproductive Freedom Project of N.Y.C.
NOW (Feb. 1989).
111. Telephone interview with Alice Kirkland, National Abortion Federation (Feb. 1989).
112. See 57 U.S.L.W. at 3441-42.
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beliefs. The balance achieved by Roe was an attempt to reconcile two ir-
reconcilable moral principles, that reproductive choice is essential to
women's autonomy, and that abortion is murder. The abortion contro-
versy, because it required the Court to address two incongruous principles
of social and moral order, is analogous to the segregation controversy. In
Brown v. Board of Education,"' the Supreme Court dealt with segrega-
tion, which like abortion continues deeply to divide American opinion, by
announcing unequivocally that segregation was morally wrong. Unlike the
Brown decision, Roe did not endorse the moral beliefs of either the femi-
nist or pro-life positions. Roe explicitly denied the argument made in an
amicus brief submitted to the Court, that a woman's right to abort her
pregnancy should be grounded in her right to control her own body." 4
The Court also explicitly addressed, but ultimately declined jurisdiction
on, the issue of when life begins in order to avoid the pro-life argument
that a fertilized egg is a human being.
Roe's political balance is both its triumph and failing. It was this bal-
ancing that enabled the decision to command sufficient assent to preserve
the authority of the Court. The moral compromise is also a failing, be-
cause sixteen years after Roe, the trimester theory of pregnancy is misin-
terpreted both by popular opinion and by the courts. Roe is popularly
believed to support a woman's access to "abortion on demand." The opin-
ion has also been cited by courts for the contradictory proposition that the
state may act, and may even be obligated to act, on its "compelling inter-
est" in third trimester fetal life to subject a woman to court-ordered sur-
gery, overriding her interest in her bodily integrity and the state's interest
in her health."'
The Roe political compromise, placing maternal health above other
state interests, did not dispose of the abortion controversy, but shifted the
political ground to the arena of maternal health. In the abortion cases
decided in the wake of Roe, the political weapon used by state legislatures
to justify limits on access to abortion has been the state's interest in pre-
serving maternal health." 6 In these cases, the Court has been called upon
113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. 410 U.S. at 154.
115. See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (1988). In this
case it was held that a terminally ill woman could be forced by hospital authorities to undergo a
caesarean delivery of a 26-week-old fetus, against her wishes and despite her own doctors' recommen-
dations. The holding in A.C. ignores Roe's mandate that the state's interest in maternal health be
paramount; in Roe the Court held that even if a state is interested in protecting fetal health, if this
interest is at odds with the state interest in preserving the woman's health-a determination to be
made by her doctor-the state cannot prohibit access to abortion. See 410 U.S. at 153. The Court's
holding requires states always to leave the abortion option open when a doctor finds it is necessary to
protect a woman's health: subsequent to viability, a state "may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion, except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother." Id. at 165.
116. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
[Vol. 1: 75
French Abortion Pill
to delineate the evolving perimeters of the current political battlefield-to
define permissible state interest in maternal health. The dramatic change
promised by RU 486, should it be approved by the FDA as a first-trimes-
ter abortion method, is that it would render one form of abortion nearly
invulnerable to limitations premised on the state's interest in maternal
health, thereby removing from a state legislature's hands its most potent
weapon against abortion rights.11 Since RU 486 is only effective and
could only be administered in the first trimester, and the FDA would
already have determined its safety, the maternal health argument could no
longer be easily marshalled by states hostile to abortion. In this sense, the
right-to-life movement's perception of the threat to its position posed by
RU 486 is accurate. At the same time, the potential foreclosure of contin-
ued maneuvering within the field of maternal health reinforces the poten-
tially dispositive role of the FDA in the event it is called upon to rule on
RU 486.
No drug company has yet petitioned the FDA to commence its safety
testing process, a process which can last several years. The reasons for
drug companies' reluctance to market the pill in the United States are
most likely the uncertainty that abortion will remain legal, the anti-abor-
tion stance of the current Administration, and the opposition of anti-
choice activists. Pro-choice forces, for their part, must address, in the
arena of administrative law, how to safeguard the FDA regulatory process
from the undue influence of organized anti-choice pressure, and uncover
the boundaries of the legitimate exercise of federal regulatory power.118
Paradoxically, we are most likely to witness the appearance of RU 486
in the United States if Roe is overturned, and abortion is again illegal.
While the prospects for an as yet undeveloped contraceptive form of RU
486 being approved by the FDA are very low,'1 9 a black market in the
pill might well spring up to meet the need for illegal abortions. In this
scenario, the pill might pose very serious health risks for women, since
many could suffer side effects, especially in the absence of medical super-
vision. Still more frightening is that women ingesting the pill illegally
would no longer have access to the back-up of safe surgical abortion.
U.S. 52 (1976).
117. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's historical deference to FDA actions, see generally
Buc & Neipris, FDA and the Supreme Court in The Food and Drug Law Institute, ed., SEVENTY-
FIFTH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE VOLUME OF FOOD AND DRUG LAW (Washington, D.C.:
The Food and Drug Law Institute, 1984), 114.
118. In recent years, AIDS activists have shed light on the critical role played by the FDA in
defining the nation's health priorities, particularly as manifested by the agency's broad discretionary
power in the drug approval process. Feminists interested in the fate of RU 486 will need to monitor
the FDA's actions with respect to RU 486 carefully in order to ensure the FDA's responsiveness to
women's health needs, just as AIDS activists now monitor the agency to ensure its accountability to
the concerns of people affected by AIDS.
119. See supra Section III and accompanying notes for a discussion of why it is unlikely that the
federal government would approve RU 486 as a contraceptive.
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